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~*~
The Symposium
as Metanarrative

Steven McClellan,
Pennsylvania State University
Plato’s Symposium, while quite brilliant as to the insights
that it has traditionally been interpreted to have offered in the
realms of emotion, love, knowledge, and human relationships is a
primary example of a metanarrative. It expresses the need for the
construction of a universalizing theory that gives legitimacy to the
particular subject being described, in this case, love. Plato uses
those particular justifications of this subject and transpose them to
legitimize an overarching brand of knowledge, in this case,
philosophy. A metanarrative is a“[hi]story” in which “knowledge
is no longer the subject, but in the service of the subject.1 Those
who create these metanarratives do so in order to legitimize their
own functions:
If they feel that the civil society of which they are members is
badly represented by the State, they may reject its
prescriptions…This reintroduces the critical function of
knowledge. But the fact remains that knowledge has no final
legitimacy outside of serving the goals envisioned by the
practical subject, the autonomous collectivity.2

In this essay, I argue that this was Plato’s very purpose for writing
the Symposium. It was an attempt to justify and legitimize a way of
life that had been called into question by the trail and death of
Socrates. Plato’s Symposium was the attempt at inverting the
narratives of the society that condemned Socrates and construct a
new narrative, based on love of knowledge. First, I discuss the
Symposium’s construction as a narrative, and how Plato uses this
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particular construction to build caricatures of normal authorities of
Athenian culture, inverting them. Then I discuss the threat that
Socrates apparently posed to society, and why Plato chooses love,
or Eros, to build his case against this argument. Finally, I will
argue that Plato’s argument that only philosophers can truly
understand Eros, breaks down the normal conception of love, and
places it at the hands of a way of life that was thought to be
threatening to ethical life of the community.
The Symposium is the story of a gathering that took place
during the crucial years of the Peloponnesian War, just a year
before Alcibiades’ Sicilian expedition. Athens at this time is an
empire on the brink, although final defeat is not yet in sight. This
gathering is said to have occurred in 416 B.C., and the telling of it
occurs in 404 B.C., the latter being after the war is lost by Athens to
Sparta.3 Present, of course are Socrates, perhaps the greatest
Athenian philosopher, as well as the great comic and adversary of
Socrates, Aristophanes. He is the only other contemporary of
Socrates to actually speak about him besides Plato, and his words
are not kind; naturally he is present. If there is a comic poet, then
there must be one of the tragic stock, and he is presented in
Agathon; although he is but a shade of the great Sophocles and
Euripides, his youthful vigor provides one of the driving points
throughout the Symposium. Also present, and offering up their
services in specialization, are Pausanias, a realist and Agathon’s
lover; Phaedrus, an idealist, Eryximachus the doctor, and finally
Alcibiades, the very lively embodiment of the glory and splendor
of a heroic tragedy. These are the main characters that give a
speech during the Symposium. However there are other important
personages, such as Diotima, and Apollodorus. Each one of these
characters has a role to play, as Plato makes use of them to
emphasize a particular point during the narration.
The Symposium itself is being told by an outsider who
admires Socrates; in turn, the narrator heard the story from
another enthusiast of Socrates, who confirmed the story with no
other great authority than Socrates himself. One could only
imagine that if anything resembling the gathering took place,
where Plato fit into this chain of hearsay. This highlights the
extent to which word was spreading around Athens of the kinds of
conversations Socrates and his group of followers were having.
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The telling does offer us the unique and descriptive insight that a
narrative supplies, and can provide the actions of the speaker, as
opposed to the reader doing the blocking in his own mind.
The moment in time that the Symposium takes place is
important for several reasons. As said, it takes place at the time
right before the collapse of the Athenian war effort, which is
brought on by the failure of Alcibiades’ famed Sicilian expedition,
a campaign in which Thucydides claimed that the participants had
an “Eros” for Sicily, one of the few mentions of Eros by the
renowned historian.4 This was the time in which the Athenian
people were beginning to mistrust both Alcibiades and Socrates,
and the former had once been the star of the public eye. This again
makes the timing of the symposium important because of the
accusation by both the Athenian state, and later by Nietzsche that
Socrates was the greatest threat to artistic and noble inclinations.5
There is truth to this argument, and Plato even acknowledges it by
the occurrence of the Symposium immediately after Agathon’s
victory in the Lenaean Festival, one of the greatest expositions of
tragic poetry. And as Allan Bloom rightly points out, “if
philosophy did not destroy Athenian culture, it prospered in its
demise.”6 It is in this atmosphere of controversy in which Plato is
attempting to rescue and legitimize philosophy against the “noble”
arts. He does so by stripping away one of the major characteristics
of poetry, Eros, and transposing it to philosophy.
The Symposium begins when an unidentified friend calls
out to Apollodorus, a follower of Socrates. This friend has heard
an account of the discussion of Eros that occurred between the
great minds of Athens, and wishes to know what was really said.
However, Apollodorus was not present either, and can only offer,
as said, a secondhand account that was provided by Aristodemus.
It is then that Apollodorus claims that he makes it his business to
know exactly what Socrates does and says each day (Plato 172c).
Apollodorus explains that until he did so he “simply drifted
aimlessly…in fact, I was the most worthless man on earth as bad
as you are this very moment: I used to think philosophy was the
last thing a man should do” (173a). This provides both the
example of the almost cult-like following received by Socrates, and
the one that is mocked by Aristophanes in Clouds; after all,
Aristodemus, who Apollodorus has received the story from, is so
far gone that he walks barefoot like his mentor (173b). It also
displays well the fact that many in Athenians do not hold
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philosophy in high regard. The purpose of this opening is clear,
and Plato is trying to focus on the exterior of Socrates, and thus the
imitation of him. As shall be seen later, Alcibiades inverts this
exterior, by being the figure of beauty and virtue, while Socrates
becomes the ugly, vulgar, almost criminal being that Nietzsche
displays (215b).8 This is the mere beginning of Plato’s inversion of
the norms of Athenian society, which he moves from Socrates
actually bathing and dressing for the occasion (174a), to him
reversing the normal pederastic norms between himself and
Agathon throughout.
It would appear that Plato chose an interesting manner of
making his narrative. Love and the erotic are not entities that
necessarily breed agreement and consensus in a community, and
indeed very much of our understanding of relationships are
contrary to the community. But what Plato wants to do is to
liberate Eros from the laws and restrictions that place boundaries
on what is possible, and by the fact that he addresses almost
immediately the issue of pederasty (which does not mean that he
accepted it) suggests that he was required to begin from the
prejudices of the symposium’s participants. Plato is here making a
clear distinction from what was being taught in Judaism, and what
will later become the Christian faith. According to Jewish law,
there is nothing beyond the law, other than God who gave it,
whereas Plato, as with the other Greeks, looked to nature to
provide laws based on reason and understanding nature. Jewish
law is based predominately on the procreative action, and God is
seen as the ultimate Father. In the Republic, the family is effectively
destroyed by the relative indifference to sacred prohibitions, and
the desire to create the best citizens. To Plato, the family becomes
the mere means to the end that is the city and the intellect. This is
in blatant contradiction to the Judeo-Christian tradition, and it is
interesting that so many Christian neo-Platonists could accept this
opposition. This arises out of the Greek habit of seeing the family
as imperfectly natural because it, “more than perhaps anything
else in human life, requires myths, conventions, and prohibitions
to hold it together, all of which stand in the way of the full
development of man’s powers, particularly the intellectual ones.”9
For Plato, the development of these intellectual abilities is
the purpose of life, and the drive is Eros, which creates the
important concept of seeing things as part of the whole. The
philosopher sees not the particular, which ordinary people
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experience, but rather the general; they see the permanent rather
than the changing, they see the intelligible rather than the visible.
In short, he understands Forms. It is this ability to look at
everything in a general way and have a complete understanding of
human nature that allows them to come to true knowledge. Plato
again is quick to criticize those such as Eryximachus who proclaim
that those who are specialized in specific fields are more practical.
This is the sum of the Symposium as a text: individual speakers give
their innermost thoughts on love, creating a dialogue of specifics
that, taken as a whole, represent the general. Therefore, the
speakers create a form of metanarrative that moves from the
distinctly individual as it is presented by the speaker, to a general
explanation as to the meaning and purpose of Eros, the god of
love.
It must be made clear that when one speaks of Socrates, one
implies Plato, the true author. Socrates becomes the mouthpiece
for his student, and the relation that ends up being concluded as a
true “Platonic love” is the one that is realized in the relationship
between Plato and Socrates (the point that Alcibiades misses).
Therefore, it is essential that a hermeneutical approach be taken in
terms of understanding the composition of the text itself. Plato
utilizes all three kinds of classical rhetoric in Symposium: Phaedrus
begins with the conventional epideictic rhetoric, the typical public
speech; Pausanias displays the deliberative, “the tool of the
political man in attempting to influence public discussions about
war and peace and the enactment of laws”;10 the third kind,
forensic rhetoric, which is used in the courts (in terms of defense
and accusation) is most closely displayed by Alcibiades, who
accuses Socrates of corrupting him.
We also have the typical Socratic dialectic of dialogue,
which is honestly what makes Plato a great writer as well as great
philosopher. The Symposium differs however, from other Socratic
dialogues in that Socrates is limited in his ability to simply
question the other speaker and allow him to divulge his own
conclusions; in fact, Socrates is himself engaged in this manner by
Diotima. The nature of the Symposium as a gathering of a
community of individuals already sets limits on the manner in
which Socrates can speak; he prefers to take people personally,
and the great ability of Socrates is to “force individuals to listen to
him and to agree with him even when they passionately do not
wish to do so,” a point made by Aristophanes.11
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The role of individuality is essential to what Socrates tries
to put forward, for it is this singular nature of the philosophic
process that makes it erotic. This is why Socrates attacks Agathon,
and (nearly) gets him to admit that he would be shameful
addressing a crowd of wise men – the poet is not erotic. Socrates
concerns himself with the crowd only inasmuch as he can draw
out the individuals and seduce them with his brand of knowledge.
For Socrates, rhetoric is about persuasion, and dialectic is about
truth; this is why he was disappointed in Agathon’s speech.
Socrates attempts to change the style of the speakers who give
their praise of Eros. He not only wants to do this because he seems
more comfortable with engaging in interpersonal dialogue, but he
also asserts that, like a lover, he needs a response. This is the
connection between Socrates and the other, which makes his
particular kind of philosophy erotic. Socrates begins his dialogue
with Agathon by trying to get him to admit that love is not simply
love, a point that Agathon completely missed, but love of
something. But Socrates he is not implying the kinds of love
between family, or even friends, because what is a son or daughter
without a mother or father? Socrates is reaching for something
more deep and profound here, something that is more shameful,
more uncomfortable, more unexamined – something erotic. This is
another part of what makes the Socratic brand of questioning so
erotic.
For probably neither of us knows anything noble and good, but
he supposes he knows something when he does not know, while
I, just as I do not know, do not even suppose that I do. I am
likely to be a little bit wiser than he in this very thing: that
whatever I do not know, I do not even suppose I know.12

This is the famous line uttered by Socrates while standing trial for
the corruption of the youth of Athens in the Apology. However,
Socrates replies to Eryximachus’ suggestion for a discussion on
love in the Symposium with enthusiasm, for “How could I vote
‘No,’ when the only thing I say I understand is the art of love?”
(177d). This line could be seen as a quip by Socrates, another
example of that famous Socratic irony. Perhaps Socrates assumes
that knowledge is something that cannot be obtained and readily
held on to: it constantly fluctuates, and is something that must be
striven for continuously. If this is so, then there are to be serious
repercussions for the Platonic system itself.
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Nonetheless, Plato seems to accept some version of this
theory himself: in the Symposium, Diotima argues that “everything
mortal is preserved, not like the divine, by always being the same
in every way, but because what is departing and aging leaves
behind something new, something such as it had been” (208a-b).
How can one have absolute knowledge on a condition such as
love, or justice, if it is always changing, and is not stable? Does
Socrates here attempt to claim that love is something which does
not change and remains static? These are the questions that are
fundamental when Socrates comes to speak towards the end of the
Symposium, and he not only claims to be the only person who
understands what is love, or the erotic, but he does so in a very
insulting manner. He understands the other speakers to be merely
trivial tourists to the soul and body, while he, as a philosopher (the
distinction between the various professions of the speakers
becomes highlighted here), can solely understand that love (Eros)
is the most liberating element for the soul. As Diotima will make
clear, the philosophic life is the highest rung on the ladder to
which a human being can climb, and it is one that is only reserved
for those lovers of knowledge. Socrates understands that his life is
finite, and this is something that many miss. Eros is the
recognition of finitude, and Socrates accepts Aristophanes’ idea of
human incompleteness. For Socrates, this incompleteness is this
finitude, and not only does he accept it, but is also comfortable
with it.
Plato seems to attempt to legitimize the rules of his own
game, namely philosophy. He understands that in society, one
does not need philosophy like one needs other kinds of trades
which legitimize the narratives of the community (priests, poets,
artists, statesmen, generals, prophets, etc). These kinds of
narrators have arisen in all societies, yet only in ancient Greece did
philosophy appear and persist, later being passed to the Romans
and Muslims. For Plato, philosophy is not merely a manner of
thought or a way of explaining complex ideas, it is not a dogma, or
even a doctrine – it is a way of life. He must therefore find a way
to show that philosophy not only matters as a respectable kind of
narrative, not only on specific topics such as nature, ethics, God,
society, or love, but also that it matters for philosophy itself.
Another one of Plato’s inversions then, is that philosophy is not
love of something, such as knowledge, it is love itself. The
Symposium is his attempt at showing how philosophy, the “love of

THE COMPARATIVE HUMANITIES REVIEW

111

knowledge,” can be a respectable and legitimate way of life.
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